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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al, \ 
Appellant, ( 
vs. ) 
vm.GINIA CLARE JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
DOCKET 
NO. 9874 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STA~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, for herself and as guard-
ian of her minor children, for damages for the wrongful 
death of her husband and father of the children, who was 
killed while in the process of removing a disa;bled motor 
vehicle and trailer from the highway when defendant drove 
a motor vehicle against the trailer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From the verdict and 
judgment for defendant and from the denial by the Court 
of plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. and/or a new 
trial plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment entered, and 
judgment as to liability in her favor as a matter of law, or 
that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about H:30 p. m.. on the evooing of June 13, 1961, 
Don R. Miln&, with his wife and daughter, was driving 
North on Highway U-28 between Gunnison and Levan, 
Utah (Tr. 6, 7). Milner was driving a 1952 Ohevrolet car 
and was pulling a two-wheel single axle trailer that he had 
made, (Tr. 9), when he struck a deer on the Highway and 
broke the rear axle on his car. After the impact with the 
deer, the Milner car and trailer came to rest, facing North, 
within a few feet of the white line marking the East edge 
of the Highway and about paTallel with that line (Tr. 9). 
The accident occurred near the bottom of a general 
dip, which is approximately one mile wide (Tr. 131). A 
car approaching from the South would be on a slight down-
grade and would have clear and nnobstructed view for one-
half mile (Tr. 131). The road is straight and was in good 
eondition on the night of the accident (Tr. 131). The high-
way had been· recently resurfaced with asphalt and was 
37 feet wide (Tr. 13,2). The East half of the roadway 
(Nrr.cthbound) was 19 feet 2 inches wide and the West half 
(Southbound) is 17 feet 10 inches wide (Tr. 138). The 
speed limit at night was 50 miles per hour (Tr. 131). The 
investigating officer coruld not place the Milner vehicles by 
exact· measurement, where they first came to rest, because 
they removed the Milner car and the wrecker before they 
made any· measure1nents (Tr. 133). 
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After hitting the deer, Mr. Milner, with his flashlight, 
flagged dorwn a car approaJching from the South and the 
car stopped some distance South of the Milner vehicle (Tr. 
10). That automobile was driven by Everett Kester and 
he was accompanied by his wife, his wife's sisteT, and four 
children (Tr. 47). Mr. Kester then pulled his car to the 
left around the Milner vehicle and stopped some distance 
to the North of the Milner vehicle, off the East. shouldeT 
of the road (Tr. 49 and Ex. 4). Kester and Milner were 
acquaintances and Mr. Kester examined Milner's car ·and 
they both decided that the only way to move it would be 
to get a wrecker (Tr. 50). 
At that time another vehicle was approaching from 
the South and J.\!Iilner flagged it down and asked the occu-
pants to send out a wrecker, which they agreed to do (Tr. 
50). About one-half hour ·later (Tr. 50), the wrecker, 
driven by James W arneT Tayor, plaintiff's decedent, came 
out from Levan and pulled off the road 00. the ·west side 
of the highway a short distance to the South of the Milner 
vehicle (Tr. 12, 51). The wrecker operator gort out of his 
wrecker, looked the situation over, and· they all agreed 
that the Milner car would have to be lifted and towed from 
its rear (Tr. 13) . Milner asked Kester if he would pull the 
trailer in and Kester agreed to do so (Tr. 52). Milner un-
hitched the trailer and they moved .the trailer to the shoul-
der on the East side of the road (Tr. 13). Its actual po-
sition on the side of the road was illustrated by the varioiUS 
witnesses as T. 2 on Exhibits 3, 4, and 5. After the 
trailer had been morved, Milner rem01ved the trailer hitch 
from his ear, (Tr. 14), and the wrecker operator moved 
the wreckeT into position to pick up the Milner car (Tr. 
13). While the wrecker operat01r was attaching the Mil-
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ner vehicle to. the wrecker, Milner and Kester were placing 
the trailer hitch on the Kester car, which had been backed 
up to a position in front of the trailer (Tr. 14, 15). 
Milner and Kester could not tighten the trailer hitch 
on Kester's car because they did not have the dght kind 
of wrench. As the wrecker opevator completed hoisting 
the Milner car, Milner asked him to bring a socket wrench 
to tighten the trailer :hitch boJts (Tr. 16). The deceased, 
on the West side of 1Jhe rtoogue otf the trailer, was leaning 
over tightening the trailer hitch (Tr. 16, 17), when the 
oollisioo whlch tooik his life occurred (Tr. 53.). Plaintiff's 
decedent had been so engaged for "a couple of minutes" 
(Tr. 24). 
At the time of the collision the wrecker was standing 
on the East half of the roadway, facing SOuth and the rear 
end of the· Milner car was attached to the w~ecker lift and 
was hoisted off the ground ('I.r. 6). The wrecke1r lights 
were on low beam, an amber light on each fro!Illt fender 
of the wrecker was flashing yellow; and a large blue light 
on top of the cab of the wrecker was oscillating. In addi-
tion, there were a number of other lights on the wrecker, 
including a flood light that. was shining on the Milner car 
(Tr .. 17, 37, 129). The lights on the Milner car were on, 
the lights on th.e Kester car were on and there were four 
flashlights on the scene, all of which were burning (Tr. 17). 
The .Milner trailer had two red reflectors mounted one on 
each side of the tailgate. These reflecto['s were 3 to 4 
inches in diameter (Tr. 10, 56). 
After the wrecker arrived at the scene and while it 
was .. in rpl~ce . on the East half of the roadway lifting the 
MUner car, a .number of orther vehicles approached from the 
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South, all of which. would slow down and pass on the West 
half of the :voadway (Tr. 19, 57, 85). 
Defendant, driving a 1959 Pontiac, was traveling North 
(Tr. 187). As she approached the scene of the accident 
there was nothing that obsCUTed her view of the highway 
(Tr. 188). She could see ahead of hex for one.Jhalf mile 
(Tr. 196). .At a point one-half mile North of the place of 
the accident (Tr. 196), she saw the lights, including the 
blue revoJving light and recognized it as, a ~ecker (Tr. 
188). When she first saw the wreckeT ·she wondered if 
there was an accident on the road (Tr. 189). As defend-
ant approached the scene orf the accident th~ were no 
other cars coming behind her or from the North (Tr. 196). 
According to the defendant she was traveling "just right 
around 60" (Tr. 194). When she gort fairly close to the 
wrecker, it "dawned" on her that the wrecker ·was OlVer 
the white line on her side of the road (Tr. 189). She did 
nothing with respect to braking or slowing down her car 
until she got to a ~int right in front of the wrecker, where 
she either had to "hit the wrecker or go around it to the 
right", and· at that time all she did was take her foot off the 
gas (Tr. 198). Part of defendant's testimony on cross-ex-
amination -was as foHows: (Tr. 198) 
"Q. All right, Miss Johnson, lets see if I under-
stand your testimony. At a time when you were ap-
proximately a half-mile South of where the impact 
ocCUITed, you could see a vehicle ahead of yoo with 
head lights and with a blue light which you at that 
point recognized .1Jo be a wrecker? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Yoru did nothing with respect to braking or 
slowing down your car until you got to a podnt right 
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in front of it where you either had ito hi:t it or go around 
it to the righrt, is that cocrect? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And at that time all you did was to take your 
foot off the gas? 
A. That's right." 
The defendant struck the trailer pushing it into the 
Kester automobile and the impact pushed both o1i those 
vehicles forward 76 feert 4 inches (Tr. 134). Plaintiff's de-
cedent, James Wamoc 'Taylor, was killed by this impact. 
Witness, Mrs. Kester, first observed the headlights of the 
defendant's ear when it was alborut seven-tenths of a mile 
away (Tr. 87). The ear was oonstantly in her view (Tr. 
91), and she estimated defendant's speed as between 70 
and 80 miles per hour (Tr. 93). 
The following diagram, appellants think, fairly dep[cts 
the respective vehicles on the roadway at the time of the 
collision. 
I-- ... ------------ --- -.lqc.. .,..- ~-.. ~.,­- I<'<< t N, 6 W'~< I c rc . e . - - - -
_'\. Af.,.,.., /,}':,.,.. ------, 
1 
1 
'f< 
Alt the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff moved the 
Court for a di,rected veroict for the plaintiff, submitting 
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to the jury only the question ·of damages. The Court took 
the motion under advisement (Tr. 206). After the jury 
returned, plaintiff moved the Court for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, which the COurt also tooik under ad-
visement (Tr. 235). Thereafter plaintiff filed written mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the 
alternative, for a new trial (R. 11). All of these motions 
were denied by the Court (R. 27). 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
1. The evidence shows, as a matter of law, that de-
fendant was negligent and that her negligence was an in-
tervening, independent sole proximate 'cause of the acci~ 
dent. 
2. That the plaintiff's decedent was not guilty of any 
contributory negligence. That even if he was, such neg-
ligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. 
3. The Court erred in instructions given to the jucy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TH!E DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW AND HErR NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDE-
PENDENT, INTERVENING, SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION. 
Plaintiff's decedent, James Warner Taylor, was on a 
rescue mission. The Milner car and trailer were immobile 
and the car could oruy be to!Wed by lifting it from the rear. 
The wrecker was in position to hoist that vehicle. The 
wrecker headlights were on 1ow beam; a flashing yellow 
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light was mounted on each of its front fenders and a large 
blue light atop its cab was oscillating. The headlights on 
the Milner car were on. The headlights on the Kester car 
were on. A floodlight on the hoisting portion of the wreckeT 
was on. In additiorn thereto, there were at least folW' flash-
lights at the scene. !Defendant, traveling Nor1Jh, oibseTved 
the lights ahead of her at a time when she was orne-half 
mile away and, at that time, recognized that one of the 
vehicles was a wrecker. She thought there might be an 
accident up ahead but, nevertheless, continued traveling, 
by her own admission, at a speed of 60 miles per hour and 
did nothing whatsoever by way of slowing her vehicle to 
bring it under oontrol so as to be aJble to avoid the collisio!ll. 
When she got so dose to the vehicles upon the roadway 
that she had to "hit the wrecker head-on, or turn to the 
right'', she merely took her ~oot off the gas and turned 
right. 
The negligence of the defendant in traveling at a speed 
greater than the speed limit and in failing to slorw dorwn 
her car or to bring the same under e0!11trol after she ob· 
served the warning lights on the vehicles on the roadway 
one-half mile in front of her, rende~rs her guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law, and her later negligence is an 
independent, intervening, sole proximate cause of the ac-
cident in question. Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products, Utah 
2nd 143, 263 Pacific 2nd 287; McMurdie vs. Underwood, 
9 Utah 2nd 400, 346 Pacific 2nd 711; Velasquez vs. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2nd 379, 366 Pacific 2nd 989. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, HOWEVER, 
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EVEN IF HE HAD, BEEN NEGLIGENT, SUCH NEG-
LIGENCE WAS Norr A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
AOCIDENT. 
The plaintiff's decedent was removing the vehicles 
from the road and rshoulder thereof. His wrecker was well 
equipped with numerous warning devices, all of which were 
on and functioning, and which gave warning in all diree-
tions for a great distance. When he arrived at the scene, 
rthe wrecker operator detffi'mined thaJt the Milner car would 
have to be hoisted from its rear and that he oould not tow 
both of the immobile vehicles, that is, both the automobile 
and the trailffi'. Mr. Kester offered to pull the trailer :in. 
Mr. Milner and Mr. Kester removed the trailer hitch from 
the Milner car and were in the process of placing the same 
on the Kester car so that the trailer could be affixed to it. 
As the decedent finished hoisting the Milner ear he was 
asked rby Mr. Milner if he (decedent) had a socket wrench 
that would tighten the trailer hitch. He secured a wrench 
from his wrecker and morved to a position between the 
Kester automobiie and the trailer for the purpose of tight-
ening the bolt. While so engaged. it was necessary that 
he devorte some time to that which he was doing and it 
wa:s nort reasonable to expect that he could have been ·as 
vigilant aborut his own safety as oibhe[" people who happened 
to be on or about a road and are nort so occupied. Reid 
vs. Owen (Utah) 93 Pacific 2nd 680. 
Inasmu~h as the defendant admitted that she saw the 
vehicle at a time when she was one-half mile away, and, 
by its warning devises, recognized it to be a wrecker, it 
seems extremely unlikely that any failure to plarce flares 
would be of any -consequence. As pointed out by the Court 
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in Velasquez vs. Greyhound Lines, supra, "If 1Jhere had 
been flares out, or even if the 1Jruck had been aflame, it 
·could have given (her) no more inform.ation". 
After ·the wrecker had pulled into position to hoist the 
Milner ear and previous rto the arrival on the scene by the 
defendant herem, a number of vehicles had approached 
from the South. All of 1Jhose drivers were able to bring 
their ear under control and could and did approach cau-
tiously and pass on arormd on the W·est half of the high-
way without any difficulty whatever (Tr. 19, 57, 85). 
Defendant argues that the plaintiff's decedent, after 
attaching the Milner automobile to the wrecker, had time 
to remo~e those vehicles off the main rtraveled portion of 
·the highway and that his failure ro do so was negligence 
which ronrtributed to the •accident in question. That po-
sitioo ignores the fact fuat there were two vehicles to be 
removed, the automobile and the trailer. Further, it loses 
sight of the fact that the trailer was not connected to 1Jhe 
Kester C8!I' and was the.refbre not lighted. To require 1Jhe 
decedent or Milner or Kester to work hitching ·the trailer 
without the protection of the wrecker warning lights, would, 
in essence, be saying that it is more dangerous to leave a 
warning light on the road than it was to leave an unlighted 
vehicle. Hirschback vs. Dubuque Packing Company 7 Utah 
2nd 7, 216 Bacific (2) 319. 
As ·pointed out by the Court in Ve~asquez vs. Grey-
hotrod Lines, Inc., supra, the problem of controlling impor-
tance o.n thls appeal is: Was fue negligence of the defend-
ant in failing to slow dOIWil or to bring her car under con-
t~ol after slhe saw the wrecker, the sole proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's decedent's death, or was the prior parking 
of the wrecker on the highway, partially obstructing the 
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Northbound traffic lane, also a concurring proximate cause 
thereof. The claimed contributory negligence 0111 the part 
of plaintiff's decedent was, one; his alleged failure to place 
flares upon fue highway and, two; the interval of time 
which amounted to approximately three (3) ·minutes which 
was used by him, afteT ·he hoisted the Milner vehicle with 
the wrecker, to tighten the trailer hitch on the Kesrter car. 
As far as the flal"es are concerned the defendant admitted 
having seen the warning lights and tJo have reoogniz·ed that 
it was a wrecker, at a time when she was one ... half mile 
away. By seeing and recognizing fuat light and by seeing 
the other lights which she could have seen had s:he been 
olbservant, she had all of the warning that any possi!ble 
signals could have given her. The second contention, that 
is, that the time utilized bY' decedent, a three minute inter-
val, used to tighten fue trailer hitch, was a proximate: cause 
of the accident, is simply saying that if the vehicles had not 
been on the road an accident would not have happened. 
POINT m 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
TO THE JURY. 
The instructions given by the Corurt to the jury, a;bout 
46 in number, are in some instances contradictory and in 
other respects serve to over-emphasize particular aspects of 
the case; to perrn.it the jury to specu[ate; are indefinite; and, 
were prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
A.Jppellant's position is that the~ defendant was guilty OJf 
negligence as a matter olf law. Also, that the negligence 
of the defendant in failing to bring her car under ~control or 
stop after she saw the warning lights and recognized 
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that the vehicle was a wrecker, at a time when she was 
approximately one-half mile away from the scene o!f the 
accident, and had ample ·time to do so, was an independent, 
intervening sole proximate 1cause of the accident. Appel-
lant took the position that the only question which should 
have been submitted to tile jury was the question of dam-
ages. A Motion for Directed Verdict for the plaintiff, sub-
mitting the question o!f damages to the jury, was made by 
the plaintiff at the conclusion of the trial (Tr. 206). Upon 
denial of that motion by the Court, and aftoc an indication 
from the Court that he intended to submit the case to the 
jury in all of its ramifications, and, after the Court had 
instructed the jury, the plaintiff excepted to the following 
instructions which the O>urrt failed to give and to the fol-
lowing instructions which the plaintiff claims were errone-
ously given by the Court. 
A. By i1:Js requested instruction No. 3, the plaintiff 
ask for an instruction in the_ nature of the last clear 
chance. T:his instruction was premised upon the admis-
sion by the defendant that she saw the lights of the wrecker 
at a tjme when she was approximately one-half mile away 
and that at that time she thought there might be an aJcci-
dent on the road, horwever, that she continued toward the 
wrecker at a great and excessive speed, without slowing 
her oar by appl~cation of braikes or otheTWise, until she 
was a few feert from the wrecker. She also admitted that 
it "dawned" on her that she had to hit the wrecker or 
turn to the right and, that s1he could not see ahead of the 
lights that were.on the wrecker, but, that even so, it was 
her intention to go around that vehicle. The plaintiff rea~ 
soned that she therefore had the last clear chance to avoid 
the accident and in these 'Circumstances. any act of negli-
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gence on the part of plaintiff's decedent, 1lhat is on the part 
of James Warner Taylor, would nOit bar recovery by the 
plaintiff. This request was supported by the cases of Bar-
nett vs. U. S. (1948) 78 Fed. Supp. 186 and by Fox vs Tay-
lor (Utah) 10 Utah 2nd 17 4. 
B. Plaintiff ~cepted to instructions Nos. 19, 20, 21, 
and 22 as. given by the Court. 
This series of instrructions deals with the problems of 
blinding lights, reaction time, anticipation of danger, and 
sudden and. une~ed peril. In other words, in substance 
and effect, with emergency situations. Although these 
matters were daimed. by the defendant as part of her th~ 
ory O!t' the case, there is no evidence whatever in the rec-
ord to support any such instructiorn. The defendant ~Saw 
the warning lights of the wrecker and thought theTe might 
be an automobile accident up the road at a time when she 
was one-half mile away. She proceeded on at am excessive 
speed without in any manner slowing her car or attempt-
ing to bring it under control until she had reached a pomt 
where, according to her, she either had to hit the wrecker 
head-on or turn to the right. If the defendant was COII1-
fronted with amy emergency in this case, it was an emer-
gency of her own ·choosing or of her own making, and. was 
not an emergency created by the action of anyorne else. 
In that event, she would not be entitled to any such in-
struction. 
Instruction No. 19, deals with the "blinding" by the 
headlights of oncoming vehicles and the obscuring of ob-
jects behind it by reason thereof. The <mly moving vehicle 
here was the vehicle driven and propelled by the defend-
ant. There is no evidence whatever that there was any 
sudden bright lights or any other blinding lights. This 
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instruction finds absolutely no factual support in the rec-
ord, is contrary to the evidence, and is prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. 
Instruction No. 20, deals with the problem of reacting 
instantaneously upon seeing danger and w1th reaction time. 
Here again, fue instruction finds no support from a factual 
basis on any testimony in the transcript of evidence. The 
warning lights on the wrecker were clearly ·visible to the 
defendant for a long distance and she did in fact see the 
warnin·g lights at· a time when she was one-half mile re-
moved from the scene m the accident. She saw the dan-
ger timely, but she failed and neglected to slow her car 
or to bring the same under.,control so that sthe would be able 
to meet the situation on the roadway ahead of her. She 
was nort entitled to the instruction and ~the instruction was 
prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
By instructioo No. 21, the jury was told that the de-
fendant was not required to anticipate or guard against any-
thing which oould not reasonably be e~ted. The jury 
were Turther told that if the defendant could not, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the collision, then 
the plaintiff could not recover. This instruction is clearly 
erroneous and is nort supported by any facts whatever in 
the transcript. After she had admitted seeing the warrrlng 
signals, timely, the effect of this instruction could only be 
to lead the jury to bel,ieve that it was required that she see 
the exact nature of the danger up the road. In the cir-
cumstances of this case such instruction is erroneous and 
prejudicial to the plaintiff 
_ Instructioo No. 22 deals with sudden and unexpected 
pe·ril. . Had the defendant turned around a oorner or come 
over the erest of a hill and been suddenly eonfronted with 
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a situation which, at her then speed, she could not. stop her 
automobile, the above instruction may have ben proper. 
In this instance the defendant saw the situation on the road-
way ahead o!f her, at a time when she wa:s one-half mile 
away, and heedlessly continued on at a great and excessive 
speed without materially slowing or bringing her oar under 
control until it was too late so to do. This instruction is 
not supported hy any evidence in the transcript, is contrary 
to the evidence in the record, and is prejudicial to the plain-
tiff and pernrlts the jury to speculate. 
C. Plailn.tiff ~cepted to instructions Nos. 30, 33, and 
34 as given by the Court. 
These three instructions, in substance and effoot, deal 
with the duty to warn and to place flares or other warning 
devices upon the roadway. The record is clear. and uncon-
troverted that the wrecker was equipped with a blue oscil-
lating light on the top of its cab, with amber flashing lights 
on each of its front fenders, a floodlight on the hoi:ster, and 
other lights mounted about the body of the wrecker, all of 
which were in operation and btllrn.ing as the defendant ap-
proached the scene. In addition the lights oo the Milner 
car were bUT'Iling, the lights on the Kester car were burning, 
and there were four flashlights, all burning, aJbout the scene. 
The transcript is also clear that the defendant observed the 
warning signals; that she thought there might be an acci-
dent up the voad, but that nevertheless, she oonrtinued on 
at an e~cessive speed without even slowing herr oar or bring-
ing the ~same under eontrol so that :she comd stop if neces-
sary to avo~d a eotlision. 
Instruction No. 30, among ortheii' things, tells the jury 
that if there were no flares or orther warning signals placed 
on the highway to warn motorists approaching from the 
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South, then ·the jury could find James W. Taylor was negli-
gent and the plaintiff could not recover if such lack of rea-
sonable care was a iFOximarte cause of the collision. This 
instruction was nort supported by any evidence whatever in 
the transcript. The record is clear thart the defendant saw 
the warning signal. The warning lights which the defend-
ant saw should have warned her that there was an object 
in front which would have to be avoided and she should 
have driven in such a manner and at such a rate of speed 
that she coruld have avoided a collision at any time, Hirsch-
bach vs. Dubuque Packing Compall1y, supra. Moreover, 
the instruction does nort say whose duty it was to place 
additional flares or wheTe such additional flares should 
have been p[aced, and leaves the matter to the speculation 
of the jury. In addition theTeto, the instruction conflicts 
with another instruction given by the Co!UI'It, No. 25, which, 
in part, tells the jury that they could not find decedent 
negligent merely because of failing to place the flares on 
the road if the wrecker was equipped with warning lights 
on its top and was then 'be.ing used to remove a stalled ve-
hicle from the highway. The instruction ,as given by the 
Court in No. 30, was improper; was not a correct statement 
of the law; is not supported by amy factual evidence, and 
was prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
By instruction No. 33, the jury were again told that 
the failure to warn approaching traffic of the obstruction 
by lights, flags, guards O[' other twactical means, may coo- ·• 
stitute negligence on the part of the wrecker operator. 
This instruction does not even require that such negligence, 
if any, he a proximate cause of the collision. What we 
have· said above with respect to instruction No. 30, is, we 
think, equally applicable to instruction No. 33. 
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By instruction No. 34, the jury were told that if they 
found that the decedent did not use ordinary care a.~d dili-
gence to warn oncoming morto['ists of t!he obstruction, then 
they should ~eturn a vermct for the defendant and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action. Like instruction No. 30 
and 33 hereinabove mentioned, this instruction is erroneous 
and prejud1!cial to the plaintiff, because defendant admit-
ted seeing the warning signals. 
The cumulative effect of the four instructions herein-
above mentioned dealing, in substance and effect, with sud-
den emergency, and the wee instructions hereina;boiVe men-
tioned deaJling with the :flailure to warn or to place flares, 
is to greatly overr-emphasize those aspects of the case. They 
permit the jury to speculate, in some instances they are in 
conflict with other instructions given by the Court and 
their effect is highly prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in refusing to direct a verdict 
for the plaintiff, leaving to the jury only the que1stion of 
damages; in refusing 1Jo grant plaintiff judgment not:Jwith-
standing the verdict, ~and the Court erred in its instruc-
tions to the jury. 
The Supreme Court should reveTSe ·and should direct 
the Trial Court to submit only the question of damages on 
a new trial, unless the Court itseU can fix the plaintiff's 
damages from the undisputed evidence offered. 
ALDRCH, BULLOCK & NE:LSON 
Attorneys £or Plaintiff and Appellant 
35 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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